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MORALITY, MARRIAGE, AND MOROCCO: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF

EX-

TRA-MARITAL RELATIONS IN RABAT

The sultry storylines of worldwide soap
operas and movies often tell torrid tales of
men and women moonlighting outside of their
relationships. While much of society considers
adultery objectionable, governments typically
view the actions of two consenting adults as
private and not criminal. In Morocco, however,
perfidy could be a path to prison. The Moroccan law on adultery, combined with an allegedly unfair court system, has caught the attention
of human rights defenders. According to a
Human Rights Watch report, a recent criminal prosecution of adultery reflects Morocco's
failure to respect the fundamental rights to fair
trial and privacy guaranteed in its 2011 Constitution, and under Article 14 (right to fair trial)
and Article 17 (right to privacy) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which Morocco ratified in 1979.
In April 2015, a Moroccan court sentenced Hicham Mansouri, age 34, along with
his female companion, age 30, to ten months
in prison for adultery. On May 27, 2015, the
Appeals Chamber of the Rabat Court of First
Instance confirmed the verdict without considering evidence that placed significant doubt on
the creditability of the police report. Additionally, Human Rights Watch expressed concern
as to whether the prosecution of Mansouri for
adultery was politically motivated by his status
as a journalist with the Moroccan Association
for Investigative Journalism, an organization
whose activities, according to some sources,
the government has "systematically blocked:'
Freedom of press remains limited in Morocco. The government tightly controls television and journalists are at risk of imprisonment for criticizing the monarchy. As of 2015,
Morocco is ranked 130th out of 180 countries
in the Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index. According to critics, despite the

promises of reform by King Mohammed VI of
Morocco in light of the Arab Spring uprisings,
Moroccan citizens have not yet fully realized
fundamental freedoms.
Mansouri's prosecution has also raised
questions about the fairness of Morocco's
judicial proceedings. According to Reporters
Without Borders, after arresting Mansouri
without a warrant, police undressed him and
then began beating him. He was also deprived
of access to his lawyers within the first twenty-four hours of his arrest. According to the
2014 Report of the United Nations (UN) Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Section
66 of Morocco's Code of Criminal Procedure
allows a detainee to access a lawyer during the
first twenty-four hours of arrest only "upon
the authorization of the Prosecutor's Office, for
only thirty minutes and in the presence of an
investigator:'
Also, at Mansouri's trial, the judge refused
to hear defense witnesses. Another Human
Rights Watch report, examining the prosecution of six criminal cases between 2008 and
2013, found strong evidence of unfair trial proceedings in Morocco. According to the report,
the use of confessions forced from defendants
by police officers served as a main justification
for the convictions. It also found that the judges failed to investigate claims by defendants
that the government forced them, sometimes
through torture or falsification, to confess to
their crimes, including fraud and terrorism.
The report concluded that the courts' lack of
oversight and investigation encouraged law enforcement personnel to use coercive measures
to obtain confessions from potentially innocent
defendants.
Rights groups claim the case of Mansouri
is clear evidence of Morocco's failure to fully
respect the fundamental rights guaranteed
under the ICCPR, including the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and the right to
fair trial. The United Nations Working Group
on Discrimination Against Women in Law
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and Practice condemns the criminalization
of adultery. It notes that when courts punish
adultery, they often do so disproportionately
against women. While acknowledging that in
some cultures, adultery may be a ground for
civil actions, the group stresses that it should
never be a criminal offense punishable by fines,
incarceration, flogging, or death.
Rights groups believe that if Morocco is
not living up to its human rights obligations,
including guaranteeing the rights to privacy,
freedom of expression, and fair trial, it should
move swiftly to implement necessary reforms.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan
E. Mendez, has recommended the country
"monitor penalty enforcement and verify its
validity;' and "strengthen the right to appeal for
those affected by disciplinary measures:' Other
rights experts have called for the end of laws
criminalizing adultery because of their disproportionate impact on women. Finally, many
believe King Mohammed should resume the
political reforms he promised in 2011.
By Andrew F. Mutavdzija, staff writer
SAUDI ARABIA AND ITS ROLE
IN THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

In late September 2015, the United Nations
(UN) Human Rights Council and Saudi Arabia
came under scrutiny for electing the Kingdom's
UN Permanent Representative Faisal Bin Hassan Trad to the Council's Consultative Group,
which is in charge of proposing a list of independent human rights experts. This criticism
comes two years after Saudi Arabia's highly
contentious election to the Council, in which
allegations arose that it traded promises and
financial support with the United Kingdom
in exchange for mutual support in its bids to
secure membership to the Council.
The most prominent aspect of the recent
criticism facing Saudi Arabia and the Council
is the apparent disconnect between electing
a representative from a country with a long
history of human rights violations to such a
key position in the U.N. body responsible for

monitoring human rights across the world.
Critics cite Saudi Arabia's sentencing of
Raif Badawi to 1000 lashes for blogging about
free speech and its indiscriminate attacks on
civilians during the recent military coalition
against Houthi rebels in Yemen as the two
recent examples of human rights violations.
Furthermore, on September 9, 2015, Amnesty
International submitted a report to the Council detailing grave concerns over Saudi Arabia's
justice system, such as passing death penalty
sentences without sufficient legal safeguards.
Under Paragraph 47 of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, the Consultative Group must "propose to the President,
at least one month before the beginning of the
session in which the Council would consider
the selection of mandate-holders, a list of candidates who possess the highest qualifications
for the mandates in question and meet the
general criteria and particular requirements:'
Mandate-holders, also called special rapporteurs, are independent human rights experts
who "report and advise on human rights from
a thematic or country-specific perspective:'
While Paragraph 39 of the resolution considers the general criteria of independence,
impartiality, and objectivity as "of paramount
importance" in nominating, selecting, and appointing mandate-holders, there are concerns
that Saudi Arabia's appointment runs counter
to the Council's creation in 2006 to replace the
widely-criticized UN Human Rights Commission. Hillel Neuer, the Executive Director
of UN Watch organization, also criticized the
appointment, calling it "scandalous" as the
country has "beheaded more people this year
than ISIS:' Ensaf Haidar, blogger Raif Badawi's
wife, described the appointment as "a green
light" for Saudi Arabia to start flogging her
husband again.
In response to mounting criticism, the
Council issued a press release on September 24,
2015, describing the condemnation as "a highly
distorted narrative:' It emphasized that the
Consultative Group is comprised of five ambassadors "who are not elected by the Human
Rights Council, or any other UN body, but
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appointed by the five regional groups and serve
in their personal capacitY:' It also refuted the
suggestion that an ambassador can unilaterally
select a mandate-holder, calling it "patently untrue:' This allays concerns over Saudi Arabia's
position in the Council and the Consultative
Group, but it does little to assuage concern that
politics are undermining the Council's stated
purpose. The UN General Assembly Resolution
60/251, which established the Council, states
that the organ should be focused on addressing
human rights violations and that it should do
so in a non-politicized system.
Contrary to those criticisms, the U.S. Department of State's Deputy Spokesperson Mark
Toner said that the U.S. "would welcome" the
appointment. In his statement, Toner took the
position that while the U.S. government continues to support Saudi Arabia, there would be
a strong dialogue whenever human rights concerns arise. He further expressed hope that the
leadership position would be "an occasion for
[Saudi Arabia] to look at human rights around
the world also within [its] own borders:'
While Saudi Arabia's appointment to the
Council has raised concerns in the international community, UN leaders have argued against
the notion that the Council will regress to the
behavior that typified the ineffective Human
Rights Commission. As Secretary General Kofi
Annan stated in an address to the Commission, the Council will be "be more accountable
and more representative" than its predecessor.
However, he also stated, "The Council will not
overcome all the tensions that accompany our
handling of human rights [because a] degree
of tension is inherent in the issues:' Some of
the tension with the Saudis is a product of
the competing goals of holding the country
accountable for its violations in some areas of
human rights while acknowledging its progress
in others. Such progress, while slow, is present
in Saudi Arabia, with previous Saudi King Abdullah appointing thirty women to the Shura
Council and giving women the right to vote
and participate in municipal elections beginning this year. Although there are fears that the
new king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, is slowing

progress, the country's leadership position in
the Council may serve as a signpost indicating
not only recognition of human rights progress,
but also an increased responsibility to uphold
human rights.
KUWAIT'S RECENT EFFORTS
IN RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS
OF DOMESTIC WORKERS

On June 24, 2015, Kuwait passed legislation
to promote the rights of over 660,000 migrant
workers within its borders, seeking to address
the abuses that many of those individuals face.
The legislation comes five years after the government passed Law No. 6 on labor law in the
private sector, which specifically left the rights
of domestic workers out. Although the new
legislation falls short of the standards under
the International Labor Organization's (ILO)
Domestic Workers Convention, many consider
it the most progressive piece of domestic workers' labor law among the Gulf States.
Kuwait's recent legislation signals an awareness of the criticism that the Gulf States have
been facing due to their failure to prevent and
redress well-documented abuse of domestic
workers. According to Kuwait's 2015 Universal Periodical Review submitted to the United
Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, foreign
workers amount "to more than two-thirds of
the population, representing more than 164
different nationalities;' many of whom perform domestic work. The abuse of domestic
workers is frequently attributed to the kafala
sponsorship system, which grants employers "substantial control over workers:' Under
this system, practiced by the majority of Gulf
States, a migrant worker's sponsor directly
controls his immigration status and freedom
to change employment for the duration of the
employment contract. Such a framework is
contrary to Article 3 of the Domestic Workers
Convention, which calls on the States Parties to
respect, promote, and realize domestic workers'
"freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining" and
to eliminate "all forms of forced or compulsory
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[labor]:' Kuwait has yet to ratify the Convention. According to the Migrant Forum in Asia,
the kafala system "often leads to the securitization of migrants should they attempt to challenge its restrictions or escape from abuse and
exploitation:' In response, the ILO Committee
of Experts in 2014 urged the government of
Kuwait to ensure that its labor laws do not
"place or maintain the workers concerned in a
situation of increased vulnerability to discrim ination and abuse, as a result of disproportionate power exercised by the employer over the
worker:'
A 2010 Human Rights Watch Report documented some of those abuses which included
the non-payment of wages, long working hours
with little or no rest, physical and sexual abuse,
and no judicial venues to seek legal redress. Recently, those abuses prompted India's Ministry
of External Affairs to issue a statement regarding the treatment of the 90,000 Indian workers in Kuwait, warning others to be careful in
seeking employment in the country.
While a number of other Gulf States, including Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, have joined
Kuwait in adopting similar legislative measures
on domestic workers' rights in order to mitigate the abusive system of kafala, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates, and Oman continue to
completely omit domestic workers from their
labor-related protective laws. However, there
are indications that Kuwait's efforts have begun
a move towards progress, with the United Arab
Emirates enacting an initiative to protect migrant workers which will take effect in January
2016. While this initiative will not address
domestic workers' rights in particular, it will
allow migrant workers to seek more effective
means of addressing situations in which they
lack compensation, suffer abuse, or wish to
terminate their employment.
While Kuwait's new legislation seems to
represent a positive step, the country still
retains the kafala system. Another significant
concern about the law is its existing ambiguity that can adversely affect migrant domestic
workers. Despite the fact that the legislation
provides a number of previously nonexistent

protections, it is unclear how this informa tion will reach uninformed workers or those
currently living in abusive situations. Furthermore, even if workers are aware of the safeguards, it is unclear what legal venues they will
have to report violations of the new legislation.
Despite its shortcomings, the law reflects
Kuwait's effort to stand by its ratification of
the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights by enacting what
will be the most progressive legislation in the
Gulf States on the rights of domestic workers.
Although it may not rise to the standards set
forth by the ILO, it will afford domestic workers significant protections, such as a twelvehour working day, a day off once a week, thirty-day paid leave, and overtime pay. There is
still work for the Kuwaiti Parliament to take in
ensuring the dignity of domestic workers, but
its most recent legislation signals not only the
willingness, but also an initiative to ensure that
the country's domestic workers equally enjoy
the fundamental human rights, particularly the
freedom of movement and compensation for
work performed.
By Isaac Morales, staff writer
HOLDING THE FREE SYRIAN
ARMY ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS
USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS

Over the past four years, the Free Syrian
Army, a coalition of non-state militias, has
been fighting against both the Assad regime
and Islamic extremist groups. Recently, human rights groups have criticized the army for
its use of child soldiers. Even amidst severe
human rights abuses committed by its rivals,
the Free Syrian Army is not exempt from
accountability. The Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
obligates its States Parties to "take all feasible measures" to prevent armed groups from
recruiting or using children under the age of
eighteen in hostilities. The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) makes
it a war crime to "conscript or enlist children
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under the age of fifteen years into the national
armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities:' The Additional Protocol II
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 also stresses that "children who have not attained the age
of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the
armed forces ... nor allowed to take part in
hostilities:' The critical question here is whether any of the three treaties can help hold the
Free Syrian Army accountable for its actions,
given its status as a non-state actor.
According to its 2014 report, Human
Rights Watch interviewed Syrian boys and
girls as young as fourteen years of age who
acknowledged joining and assisting the Free
Syrian Army with a range of different duties
such as carrying supplies, loading ammunition, informing on enemy movements, or even
fighting on the frontlines. While factions and
affiliates of the Free Syrian Army have entered
into agreements to eliminate the enlistment of
children into their ranks, leaders within those
entities told Human Rights Watch that the
practice continues.
In October 2013, the Syrian government
ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.
It declared that it does not "permit any person
under [eighteen] years of age to join the active
armed forces:' While the prosecution of alleged violations of the protocol is theoretically
in the hands of the government, the nature
of the ongoing civil war precludes the regime
from exercising this power over the Free Syrian
Army. In addition, the international community has strongly condemned the regime for its
gross human rights violations, including its use
of children in hostilities. As such, the Assad regime does not seem to be in a position to hold
the Free Syrian Army accountable.
Another avenue to justice, the Rome
Statute, imposes individual criminal responsibility on war criminals. Pursuant to its Article
25, a natural person is criminally responsible,
if he or she commits an enumerated crime,
"whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person:' Under Article

12, however, in order for the ICC to exercise
its jurisdiction over an individual who is not a
national of a State Party, the country concerned
must first accept the ICC's jurisdiction over the
conduct at issue. As Syria is not a party to the
Rome Statute, and as the international community has already accused its armed forces
of a slew of atrocities, it seems highly unlikely
Syria will invite the ICC to prosecute its rebel
groups.
A third option, Article 6 of the Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, calls
for the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenses occurring in non-international
armed conflicts, including the recruitment of
children under the age of fifteen by non-government forces. In fact, Article 8(2)(e) of the
Rome Statute implicitly refers to this measure;
it considers the act of "[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years
into armed forces or groups or using them to
participate actively in hostilities" as a serious
violation "of the laws and customs applicable in
armed conflicts not of an international character:' Furthermore, according to a study conducted by the International Committee of the
Red Cross, the prohibition against the recruitment of children in hostilities "is a norm of
customary international law applicable in both
international and non-international armed
conflicts:' However, the ongoing civil war in
Syria coupled with alleged gross human rights
violations by the Assad regime and extremist
militia groups makes the prospect of holding
the Free Syrian Army accountable in the near
future a remote one.
As the civil war continues to devastate
Syria, human rights organizations will continue
to document gross violations on all sides of the
conflict. But it is critical for the future of any
post-war nation to hold accountable the perpetuators of gross human rights violations and
to recognize the power of international human
rights and humanitarian law in doing so.
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PALESTINIAN CHILD LABOR
IN ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

In November of 2015, the European Commission issued new guidelines related to goods
made in Israeli settlements. The Commission
reiterated the European Union's position of not
recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the occupied territories, including the Golan Heights,
the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, under international law. In response to
a demand for clarity as to the source of products from the areas annexed by Israel, the new
guidelines require the goods to have labels stating the word "settlement" and the geographical
origins of the products. But one crucial issue
lost in the discussion of the product-labeling
regulations is the employment of hundreds of
Palestinian children in Israeli settlements.
In April 2015, Human Rights Watch published a seventy-eight-page report detailing the
employment of Palestinian children in Israeli
settlements, particularly in the agricultural
sector. It documents "rights abuses against Palestinian children as young as [eleven] years old
who earn around $19 for a full day of working
in the settlement agricultural industrY:' It also
finds many children do not attend school and
work in hazardous conditions with pesticides
and dangerous equipment. Some children
interviewed described "vomiting, dizziness,
and skin rashes after spraying pesticides with
little protection, and experienced body pain
or numbness from carrying heavy pesticide
containers on their back:'
While the dispute over the occupied territories and Israel's annexation of the West
Bank remains a highly contested issue both
domestically and internationally, the respect
for the rights of the child, including the prohibition of child labor, is well settled. Article 32
of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), to which Israel is
a party, requires states to "recognize the right
of the child to be protected from economic
exploitation and from performing any work
that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere
with the child's education, or to be harmful to

the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual,
moral or social development:' The provision
also mandates that states establish a minimum
age of child employment along with appropriate hours and proper work conditions. In 1998,
the Israeli government amended the country's
Youth Employment Law in an effort to implement the CRC. The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of fifteen.
It also forbids children from work that would
adversely affect their physical, mental, and educational development, including "potentially
hazardous mechanical, physical, chemical, and
biological elements:' Yet the Human Rights
Watch report indicates that Israel has failed to
equally apply the law to Palestinian children
working in the settlements. The CRC Committee, in its 2013 Concluding Observations on
Israel, highlighted the government's "persistent
refusal to provide data and to respond to the
Committee's written questions on children
living in the [occupied territories] :'
Furthermore, Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) imposes a similar obligation
on Israel. It underscores that " [c] hildren and
young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to their morals or health
or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their
normal development should be punishable by
law:' According to Human Rights Watch, twenty-one of the children who were working fulltime on the farms had dropped out of school
in tenth grade or earlier. Schoolteachers and
administrators told Human Rights Watch that
many students drop out to work in the settlements. Under impoverished conditions, severely restricted access to water, and with limited
agricultural development in the West Bank,
Palestinian families often permit their children
to work for settler-employers who pay them
well below the minimum wage for minors in
Israel in order to help support the family. In
its last Concluding Observations of 2011, the
ICESCR Committee particularly recommended the Israeli government "intensify its efforts
to lower the high dropout rate for Arab Israeli
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and Bedouin children:'
Israel is also a State party to the Minimum
Age Convention of the International Labour
Organization (ILO). Pursuant to Article 2 of
the Convention, the minimum age of employment "shall not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling and, in any case,
shall not be less than [fifteen] years:' In addition, under Article 3, "The minimum age for
admission to any type of employment ... likely
to jeopard[ize] the health, safety or morals of
young persons shall not be less than [eighteen]
years:' Article 7, however, allows the employment of minors between the ages of thirteen to
fifteen on "light work'' that would not adversely
affect their health and educational development. In 2012, the ILO Committee requested
the Israeli government "take the necessary
measures to bring its national practice into
conformity with the Convention by permitting
employment in light work only for children
who have reached the age of [fourteen] years:'
While the overarching issue remains the legality of the Israeli settlements in the occupied
territories, violations of international child
labor laws raise serious human rights concerns. Under the relevant international treaties,
the financial hardship of Palestinian families
does not give license for allowing children to
work in a way that would adversely affect their
health and educational development.
By David Weinstein, staff writer

IRANIAN WOMEN'S RIGHT TO
WORK IN PUBLIC SECTOR

According to rights groups, Iranian women
have been taking two-steps forward and one
step back in their push for equality, particularly
the right to equal employment opportunities
and to hold public office. Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, women could serve as judges, elected representatives to the Iranian Parliaments, and even members of the Cabinet. But
when Iranians took to the streets in opposition
to the Pahlavi Dynasty, women saw the future
of Iran as even more promising. Young female
students in particular viewed the Shah's regime

as a monarchy heavily influenced by Western
Powers that had no tolerance towards alternative political parties or ideologies. The Islamic
Revolution was indeed a message of change for
many Iranian women. Yet soon after Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini became Supreme Leader
of the country, the hope for more civil liberties
quickly dissipated, particularly the evolution of
women's right to equal employment opportunities.
The existing legal framework of the Islamic
Republic may deny women the ability to hold
high decision-making positions. Under Iran's
Constitution, many of those positions are
"exclusively tailored for Shi'ite fuqaha (jurists)
and mujtahids (Islamic jurists who are capable
of an independent derivation of Islamic rules
from the primary sources):' For example, Article 99 of the Constitution gives Iran's Guardian
Council the authority to supervise the elections
of "the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the
President of the Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly [Parliament], and the direct
recourse to popular opinion and referenda:'
The Law No. 1234of1991 interpreted that provision to give the Council a sweeping power to
monitor public elections, including the rigorous process of vetting candidates. According to
Majlis Monitor, an Iranian watchdog organization, " [t] his aggressive vetting, which at times
has prevented entire political groups from
running in elections, persists today and has
been a cornerstone of continued conservative
dominance of Iran's parliament:' This process
in effect has barred many women candidates
from participating in the decision-making
process of the country. Although Article 115 of
the Constitution does not expressly bar worn en from running for president, the Council
in 2004 declared that it "has not changed its
interpretation of Article 115 and women still
may not be elected as President:' According to
the United Nations Statistics Division, since
1997, Iranian women have held less than five
percent of parliamentary seats. Specifically,
during the course of nine parliamentary terms,
out of2700 members of Parliament, only seventy-three were women.
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Women's right to participate in Iran's judiciary system is also limited. Although women
may acquire a legal education, the existing laws
bar them from serving as judges. Under Article 163 oflran's Constitution, the conditions
and qualifications to serve as a judge must be
in accordance with "the criteria of fiqh [Sharia law or Islamic law]:' Soon after the 1979
Revolution, conservative clerics made a series
of religious pronouncements removing worn en, including Shirin Ebadi, the recipient of the
2013 Nobel Peace Prize, from their positions as
judges. While an amendment to the Process of
Appointment of Judges Act of 1982 recognized
the possibility of women "as counselors and in vestigators;' the role of judicial decision-making continues to remain exclusively with men.
Iran has ratified multiple international treaties relevant to women's rights. It is currently
a State Party to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Under Article 25 of
the ICCPR, every citizen "shall have the right
and the opportunity ... without unreasonable
restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of
public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; [and] (b) to vote and to be
elected at genuine periodic elections:' Similarly,
Article 6 of ICESCR calls on States Parties to
recognize "the right to work, which includes
the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain
his living by work which he freely chooses or
accepts:'
In response to Iran's third periodic report
on the implementation of the ICCPR, the
Human Rights Committee expressly requested
Iran explain why the country continues to exclude women from decision-making positions
including the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the judiciary. The government
of Iran replied to the Committee by claiming
that "there is no gender limit stipulated for
membership on the Guardian Council and the
Expediency Council:' With respect to judicial
opportunity for women, it provided statistics
indicating that in 2003, "there were exactly
161 women judges and 4 women deputies of

Judicial Complexes:' According to Iran Human
Rights Documentation Center, however, the
"so-called women 'judges' [were] not permitted
to make substantial decisions in any case;' and
none of the 100 branches of General and Revolutionary Courts included a female judge.
While Iran's existing legal framework
continues to hinder women's participation in
the county's decision-making process, rights
groups and international organizations believe
that by amending current laws, the government
can still take positive steps in realizing the
equal rights of Iranian women promised thirty-six years ago when the Islamic Revolution
took place.
By Jessica Lee McKenney, staff writer

